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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 11, 2004, the Seventh Circuit declared that Esther
Olowo should be removed from the United States and sent back
to her native country of Nigeria. The court ordered the deporta-
tion of Mrs. Olowo because of her attempts to smuggle an un-
documented Nigerian child into the country in direct violation
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(a)(6)(E)(i). 1
On appeal Mrs. Olowo argued she should be granted asylum in
the United States based on the fear that if she was forced to
return to Nigeria, her twin daughters would also be "construc-
tively deported" and forced to undergo female genital mutilation
(FGM).2 The issue facing the court was whether a valid asylum
claim should be extended to a mother who feared her children
would be subjected to persecution, against her will, if forced to
return to- Nigeria. 3 Significantly, both daughters were legal
permanent residents of the United States, and it was uncon-
tested that it was in their best interests to remain in the United
States. In making its decision, the court weighed the conse-
quences of the girls going back to Nigeria with Mrs. Olowo,
against the consequences of allowing Mrs. Olowo to remain in
the United States despite her illegal activity. 4
Olowo v. Ashcroft is one of several recent cases to address
the "parent-child FGM issue."5 The circuits are split over this
issue because of the varying statutory interpretation and differ-
ing applications of the term "persecution."6 0 lowo, a Seventh
Circuit case, is within the group of cases holding that a mother
(the most common family member trying to make this claim)
cannot "bootstrap" her asylum claim to the threat facing her
children. 7 Under § 208(b)(3) of the INA, asylum granted to par-
ents can be extended to spouses and children under the concept
1 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2004).
2 Id. at 695; see also Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents: Why Mothers and Fa-
thers Who Oppose Female Genital Cutting Qualify for Asylum, 04-11 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 1, 18 (2004) ("constructive deportation refers to the de facto removal of a
citizen or resident child that typically occurs when the minor's care-taking parent
is removed from the country").
3 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701.
4 See id. at 701-02.
5 See Rice, supra note 2, at 1.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 5.
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of "derivative asylum."8 However, the statute does not mention
the extension from children to parents. Thus, some courts, such
as those in the Seventh Circuit, prevent parents from seeking
asylum through their children's potential persecution. 9
The opposing viewpoint, led by the Sixth Circuit, holds that
a mother's asylum claim is independently valid because she
fears her own persecution - the persecution of seeing her child
suffer from FGM. 10 A mother, in such jurisdictions, may claim
asylum under a broadened interpretation of the term "persecu-
tion," which includes emotional pain.1" This article argues that
courts across the country should administer the broader inter-
pretation of a mother's independent persecution and that the
best way to accomplish this consistency is to develop this area of
asylum law in order to remove the problem of statutory
misinterpretation.
Consistency when dealing with the issue of child-parent
FGM can only be achieved through legislative improvements by
Congress, not through inconsistent judicial interpretation.
Congress needs to adopt specific requirements to ensure a bal-
ance between competing policies; controlling the number of asy-
lum claims based on the fear of harm to another family
member, as well as ensuring family unity in the best interests
of a child. 12 Immigration law cannot continue to ignore this in-
creasingly prevalent problem. It is against both American and
international values to remove a family to a country where
physical and emotional persecution awaits their return. During
the process of developing new legislation, Congress should re-
search the asylum laws of Canada, the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, and other international bodies to gain insight into
different humanitarian policies. 13
Every year approximately two million girls across the globe
are subjected to the horrors of female genital mutilation.14 To-
8 Immigration and Nationality Act 208(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006).
9 See id.; Rice, supra note 2, at 18.
10 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004).
11 Rice, supra note 2, at 8.
12 See Rice, supra note 2, at 14.
13 See id. at 10.
14 United Nations Organization, "What is Female Genital Mutilation? What
Actions are Being Taken to Prevent it?," available at http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/
factsheets/FS3.HTM.
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day, there are over eighty-four million living women who have
been persecuted by some form of this inhumane treatment. 15
Moreover, due to increased rates of immigration, instances of
FGM occur in the adopted homelands of immigrants such as the
United States, Canada, and Italy. 16 These countries are com-
monly referred to as "receiving countries"' 7 because of the large
number of immigrants from Africa.
The practice of female genital mutilation is referred to by
many names: "female genital cutting," "female genital circumci-
sion," "female genital surgery," "ritual genital surgery" and
"sexual mutilation."' 8 According to many scholars, the phrase
"female genital circumcision" is less accurate and should not be
used because, in comparing male and female circumcision, male
circumcision is a less dangerous and severe procedure.' 9 In
1999 the USAID Intra-Agency Working Group sponsored a
symposium entitled, "Female Genital Cutting: The Facts and
the Myths," where the term "female genital mutilation" was de-
fined as:
[A] harmful traditional cultural practice that involves any altera-
tion or cutting of the female genitalia. Procedures range from
snipping or removal of the clitoris and the labia minora to excision
of all the external genitalia, with tight closure of the resulting
wound. This practice is rooted in closely held traditions gov-
erning women's status, identity, and marriageability. 20
15 The majority of women who suffer from FGM live in Africa and the Middle
East. Fran P. Hosken, Female Genital Mutilation Strategies for Eradication,
Presented at The First International Symposium on Circumcision (Mar. 1-2, 1989),
available at http://www.nocirc.org/symposia/first/hosken.html.
16 Id.; see also Julia M. Masterson & Julie Hanson Swanson, Female Genital
Cutting: Breaking the Silence, Enabling Change, International Center for Re-
search on Women and the Centre for Development and Population Activities
(2000), http://www.icrw.org/docs/FGCfinalpdf.pdf.
17 FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A GUIDE TO LAWS AND POLICIES WORLDWIDE
57 (Anika Rahman & Nahid Toubia eds., 2000) [hereinafter Rahman].
18 Id. at 4.
19 Marianne Sarkis, Female Genital Cutting (FGC): An Introduction, Female
Genital Cutting Education and Networking Project, available at http://www.
fgmnetwork.org/intro/fgmintro.html.
20 Masterson & Swanson, supra note 16, at 10; see also HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS AND AFRICAN EXPERIENCES 269 (Wolfgang
Benedek et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Benedek] (another definition endorsed by
WHO, UNICEF, and UNFPA in 1997 described FGM, "as all procedures involving
partial or total removal of the external female genitalia or other injury to the fe-
male genital organs whether for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons.").
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Despite the combined efforts of the international legal com-
munity and the United States to denounce this form of brutali-
zation, FGM remains a widespread problem.21 Proponents of
FGM are avid supporters of the procedure's symbolism and tra-
dition. Consequently several countries, such as Nigeria, refuse
to endorse national laws prohibiting the practice. 22 Today, in-
ternational activists and nongovernmental organizations are
trying to gain momentum in a grassroots approach at state and
local levels. 23 Activists in Nigeria and other countries stress
the importance of establishing a strong educational movement
to teach people about the health hazards and severe persecution
caused by FGM. 24
This article reviews the United States Court of Appeals de-
cision in Olowo v. Ashcroft25 and examines the case's signifi-
cance in the evolution of asylum law and female genital
mutilation. Section II outlines the historical background of fe-
male genital mutilation and the background of the Olowo case.
Section III reviews the case law concerning asylum law and
FGM prior to the Olowo decision. Section IV analyzes the Sev-
enth Circuit's decision and compares it to the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Abay v. Ashcroft,26 which was decided the same week
as Olowo but came to an irreconcilable conclusion. These two
cases highlight the inconsistency in judicial interpretation of
INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). This article argues
that the Sixth Circuit's holding exposes the flaws of the Seventh
Circuit's decision. Section V discusses Olowo in the context of
past important cases and legislation on the international, na-
tional, and state levels. The discussion also explores the threat
Olowo presents to the current laws and policies of the United
States that promote family unity. Section VI suggests the need
for future legislation. Section VII concludes that FGM remains
an important developing aspect of asylum law because the hor-
rors of FGM will continue until the world recognizes the sever-
21 Masterson & Swanson, supra note 16, at 10.
22 See Masterson & Swanson, supra note 16.
23 See id.
24 U.S. Department of State, Nigeria: Report on Female Genital Mutilation or
Female Genital Cutting, available at http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/showDocu-
ment.cfm?documentID=1206.
25 Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2004).
26 See generally Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634.
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ity of the problem and begins to educate communities
worldwide. Thus, in the meantime, the United States must
pass legislation that provides protection to both the girls at risk
of female genital mutilation and their parents who face severe
emotional persecution, because as this article suggests, the two
are inevitably linked.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF FEMALE
GENITAL MUTILATION
A. Types of Female Genital Mutilation
The harm of FGM threatens women of all ages, religions,
and races. Mutilation is performed on infants, brides on their
wedding night, and even new mothers shortly after giving
birth.27 There are three main types of genital operations to
which a woman may be subjected.28 Typically, the form of FGM
practiced is determined by geographic location and local tradi-
tion. 29 The first type of mutilation is called "Sunna Circumci-
sion," which is defined by the World Health Organization as the
"[elxcision of the prepuce with or without excision of part or all
of the clitoris."30 Sunna is mainly practiced in Nigeria and
other African countries, but it reportedly occurs in some Middle
Eastern countries, such as Oman and Saudi Arabia. 31 The sec-
ond procedure, "Clitoridectomy,"32 includes, "[e]xcision of the
clitoris together with partial or total excision of the labia mi-
nora."33 Approximately eighty-five percent of women subjected
to FGM undergo this procedure. 34 Sudan midwives began this
form of FGM when the most extreme form of infibulation was
prohibited by Great Britain in 1946. 35 Infibulation is the third
27 See Layli Miller Bashir, Female Genital Mutilation In the United States: An
Examination of Criminal and Asylum Law, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L.
415, 420 (1996).
28 See Karen Hughes, The Criminalization of Female Genital Mutilation in
the United States, 4 J. L. & POL'Y 321, 327-28 (1995) [hereinafter Hughes].
29 See id. at 332; see also Bashir, supra note 27.
30 1995 World Health Organization (WHO) Classification of FGM, available
at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs241/en/ [hereinafter WHO
Organization].
31 See Sarkis, supra note 19.
32 Id.
33 WHO Classification, supra note 30.
34 See Benedek, supra note 20, at 270.
35 See Sarkis, supra note 19.
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and most severe type of FGM: "[E]xcision of part or all of the
external genitalia and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal open-
ing."36 Once the woman is sewn together only a small hole is
left open for her to urinate and menstruate. During the recov-
ery process, the girl's legs are tied together for weeks to ensure
the hole is closed as much as possible.37 She must be cut open
later to engage in intercourse with her husband, and then
closed up again to ensure she remains faithful. 38 This form of
FGM is most often seen in Sudan, Somalia, and Djibouti, where
eighty to ninety percent of women experience the most severe
form of mutilation by having their clitoris completely
removed.39
B. The Debate Over the Practice of Female Genital
Mutilation
Proponents of female genital mutilation argue there are
several reasons why traditions of genital cutting should prevail.
Traditional family values, religion, group identity, and cleanli-
ness are among the most common arguments for perpetuating
genital mutilation.40 Some followers of Islam and Christianity
support FGM; however, their argument that the tradition is
founded in religious doctrine is mistaken because the practice
began in ancient Egypt in the fifth century B.C., long before the
existence of either religion. 41 The sustained practice of FGM is
not only based on religious and cultural traditions, it also exists
to ensure men's power and control over women.42 The so-called
"tradition" is often presented with elaborate ritual ceremonies
viewed as a rite of passage necessary for a girl or woman to ful-
fill her role in becoming part of the community.43 Many poor
families believe the procedure can bring a sense of pride, value,
and honor to the family when they otherwise are viewed as in-
feriors within their community.44 Many believe that respect for
36 WHO Classification, supra note 30.
37 See Benedek, supra note 20, at 270.
38 See Sarkis, supra note 19.
39 See Benedek, supra note 20, at 270.
40 See Bashir, supra note 27, at 424-25.
41 Hughes, supra note 28, at 331.
42 See id.
43 Id. at 334.
44 See Benedek, supra note 20, at 271.
2006]
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the family will put them in a better position to arrange a proper
marriage for their daughter.45
Okumephuna Chinwe Celestine from southern Nigeria de-
scribed the barbarism of the female cutting "ritual." She said, "I
heard a voice of a young girl shouting desperately for help in-
side a closed door. I peeped through the key hole .... Inside
that conclave were four hefty women; three of them stretching
apart the young girl's legs while the fourth was poking a sharp
object in her clitoris."46 The operation required surgical instru-
ments and anesthesia, however, neither were used, instead
"screaming children [were] held down by force on the ground in
dark huts, with crude knives or any other cutting tools." 47
Celestine grew up to understand that the main purpose of
continuing the practice of FGM was to ensure women would not
enjoy sexual activities, thereby preventing women from becom-
ing promiscuous. 48 Sex is considered in many cultures to be an
act done for a man's enjoyment and something a woman does
out of duty to her husband.49 Proponents of FGM believe that
the narrower opening to the vagina left after mutilation is more
pleasing to a woman's husband but, "this view ignore[s] the ex-
cruciating pain a mutilated woman endures during sex in order
to facilitate this heightened pleasure ..... 50 In certain regions
of Nigeria, for example, it is a precondition that a woman be
circumcised before she can be married.51 The fear of not accom-
plishing marriage and dishonoring the family is so great that
women allow the continuation of FGM.52 Older women in the
family or community aid in the tradition by performing the cut-
ting and holding down the young child. Consequently, their ac-
tions support the continuation of male domination. For
example, in The Gambia, the older women who perform the pro-
45 See id. at 271; see also FEMALE "CIRCUMCISION" IN AFRICA: CULTURE, CON-
TROVERSY, AND CHANGE 254 (Bettina Shell-Duncan & Ylva Hernlund eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Shell-Duncan].
46 Okumephuna Chinwe Celestine, FGM: An Insult On The Dignity Of Wo-
men, available at http://fgmnetwork.org/countries/nigeria.htm [hereinafter
Celestinel.
47 Hosken, supra note 15.
48 See Celestine, supra note 46.
49 See id.
50 Bashir, supra note 27, at 427.
51 See Celestine, supra note 46.
52 See Benedek, supra note 20, at 273.
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cedure are thought to have "supernatural powers" and are re-
vered, and in Sierra Leone they are known as "priestesses."53
Many women superstitiously fear that if they do not undergo
the procedure they will not be able to have children, which is
viewed as a central goal and purpose in their life.54 Activists
correctly argue that it is only through the promotion of educa-
tion that the dangers of this practice will be understood in order
to persuade people to abandon the painful tradition. 55
AIDS, child birth complications, severe hemorrhaging, in-
fections, ulcers, and tetanus, are a few examples of the serious
repercussions that result from the unsanitary and painful pro-
cedure.56 Many girls suffer from the inability to urinate and
have repetitive urinary tract infections. Some girls even die
due to the severe shock and pain of the procedure.57 Moreover,
the psychological trauma that comes from the invasion of a deli-
cate and private area of the body is simply unbearable for many
women.
58
C. Female Genital Mutilation in Nigeria
In order for the courts in the United States to correctly un-
derstand the fear and sense of persecution facing women re-
turning to countries where FGM is practiced, the judiciary must
be aware of the customs and social pressures that exist. Esther
Olowo came from Nigeria, the most highly populated African
country. 59 According to the Hosken Report in 1993, sixty per-
cent of women were subjected to FGM in Nigeria, totaling
36,750,000 - the highest number reported in all of Africa. 60
Even in the twenty-first century, Nigeria remains a patriarchal
society, "in which authority [is] held by the extended family."61
Women lack most decision making power and, in many areas,
are denied the rights to inheritance, the right to own land, and
53 Id. at 271.
54 See id. at 272.
55 See Sarkis, supra note 19.
56 See Bashir, supra note 27, at 423.
57 See id. at 422-23.
58 See Hughes, supra note 28, at 331.
59 See Shell-Duncan, supra note 45, at 96.
60 NAHID TOUBIA, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: A CALL FOR GLOBAL ACTION
24-25 (2d ed. 1995).
61 Shell-Duncan, supra note 45, at 97.
2006]
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the right to proper medical treatment. 62 There is no law in Ni-
geria that protects women from FGM. 63 The government has
refused to prohibit the procedure or make it a crime.64 Thus,
women are left to face the pressures without legal protection.
Another problem currently emerging in Nigeria that is as-
sociated with FGM is the increased number of medical doctors,
nurses, and midwives, who perform the procedure to supple-
ment their salaries. The ethical dilemma presented to physi-
cians is whether to provide a safer and more sanitized
procedure or to denounce the procedure completely and allow it
to be performed by nonprofessionals causing increased side ef-
fects. 65 Understanding the situation in Nigeria and other coun-
tries with FGM problems will aid both legislators and judges in
their law making decisions.
III. PRECEDING CASE LAw AND LEGISLATION BEFORE OLOWO
v. ASHCROFT
During the early 1990's, concern over female genital muti-
lation began to gain momentum in the social and political are-
nas of the United States. In 1995, Congress passed the Federal
Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act as a Title 18
Amendment. 66 The Act criminalized the practice of FGM as a
62 Shell-Duncan, supra note 45, at 97.
63 Rahman, supra note 17, at 200.
64 Id.
65 See id. at 102-03; see generally Benedek, supra note 20, at 272.
66 Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 1995, July 13 (leg-
islative day, July 10) 1995, available at http://www.fgmnetwork.orgfindex.php
(follow "Legislation" hyperlink; then follow "Federal: HR 3019" hyperlink) [herein-
after Federal Prohibition].
116. FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION
"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises,
excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia
minora or clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of 18
years shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both.
(b) A surgical operation is not a violation of this section if the operation is
(1) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed, and
is performed by a person licensed in the place of its performance as a
medical practitioners; or
(2) performed on a person in labor or who has just given birth and is
performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by
a person licensed in the place it is performed as a medical practi-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol18/iss1/13
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way to protect minors from the invasive procedure. Both the
person performing the operation and the person who requested
the genital cutting would be subjected to criminal punishment
under the law.67 Congress' legislation prohibited FGM within
the borders of the United States; however, the related problem
of aliens seeking asylum from the harms of FGM abroad were
not covered by the 1995 Act. This area of the law was left to be
developed by the judiciary.
The first case to address the issue of female genital mutila-
tion as a form of persecution was Matter of Oluloro.68 In that
case, the United States suspended the deportation of Lydia
Oluloro, a Nigerian citizen, in order to protect her daughters
from "the extreme hardship" of FGM in which they would be
subjected to if forced to returned to Nigeria. 69 The immigration
judge's favorable decision, however, had "no precedential value"
because 1) the INS chose not to appeal to the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) and 2) Lydia Oluloro independently satisfied
the criteria of, "good moral character, seven years of continuous
presence in the United States, and demonstrated 'extreme
hardship' if forced to return."70 Thus, the issue remained dor-
mant for three years before a BIA judge would decide whether
tioner, midwife, or person in training to become such a practitioner of
midwife.
(c) In applying subsection (b)(1), no account shall be taken of the effect on
the person on whom the operation is to be performed of any belief on the
part of that or any other person that the operation is required as a matter
of custom or ritual.
(d) Whoever knowingly denies to any person medical care or services or
otherwise discriminates against any person in the provision of medical
care or services, because -
(1) that person has undergone female circumcision, excision, or
infibulation;
or
(2) That person has requested that female circumcision, excision, or
infibulation be performed on any person;
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
67 See id.
68 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoted in In re
Oluloro, No. A72 147 491 (Dep't Justice Mar. 23, 1994) (oral decision)).
69 Id.
70 These are the criteria to suspend deportation under 8 U.S.C. 1254(a)(1)
(2006); see also Barret Breitung, Interpretation and Eradication: National and In-
ternational Responses to Female Circumcision, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 657, 674-75
(1996).
2006]
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FGM was a form of "persecution" appropriate to support a refu-
gee claim. 71
Finally in 1997, the BIA made the first binding precedent,
in In re Kasinga.72 Kasinga was a seventeen-year-old girl who
belonged to an organization that opposed the local practice of
FGM. Determined to avoid circumcision, she escaped from her
tribe and sought refuge in the United States. 73 The Board ap-
plied the Federal Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act
and held that in order to gain refugee status a person must sat-
isfy the statutory requirements of section 208 of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA), which defines a refugee as,
[A] ny person who is outside any country of such person's national-
ity or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person has habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to
avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion .... The term "refugee" does not in-
clude any person who ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise par-
ticipated in the persecution of any person on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. 74
Kasinga had to overcome several obstacles before the courts
could grant her asylum: 1) she had to fit within the above defi-
nition of "refugee," 2) she had to show she belonged to a specific
persecuted group and 3) she had to prove herself to be a credible
witness. 75 The first two criteria were deemed satisfied by the
court because of her affiliation with a particular social group in
Togo which objected to FGM, and she had a "well founded fear
of persecution" as a member of this particular social group.76
Kasinga satisfied the third criteria of being a credible witness
by providing the court with "plausible, detailed, and internally
71 See Amy Stern, Female Genital Mutilation: United States Asylum Laws Are
in Need of Reform, 6 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 89, 99-100 (1997).
72 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
73 Id.; see also Stern, supra note 71, at 99-100.
74 Connie M. Ericson, Note: In Re Kasinga: An Expansion of The Grounds for
Asylum for Women, 20 Hous. J. INT'L L 671, 673 (1998).
75 Id. at 676-77.
76 Id. at 681-82.
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consistent" testimony about the situation in Togo concerning
FGM. 7 7 This case established the precedent for the BIA to clas-
sify FGM as an independent form of "persecution" and, thus,
"expanded the reach of asylum law for women."78
After the Kasinga decision, two questions emerged concern-
ing the scope of the court's decision. First, whether the ruling
included the right to grant asylum to a parent who seeks to stay
in the United States in order to prevent her daughters from un-
dergoing FGM and secondly, whether a woman who was sub-
jected to FGM in the past can seek asylum in the present.79 The
unanswered questions of Kasinga have resurfaced in appellate
decisions over the last several years-one decision being Olowo
v. Ashcroft.80
IV. CIRCUIT COURT CASES IN 2004
A. Background of Olowo v. Ashcroft
In 2002, Esther Olowo, a permanent U.S. resident, agreed
to go to the Bahamas to help her friend, Mr. Ali, illegally bring
his daughter into the country.81 Mr. Ali requested Mrs. Olowo's
assistance because he did not trust his ex-wife to bring their
daughter, Grace, to Chicago upon entering the United States as
they had agreed.8 2 Mr. Ali purchased Mrs. Olowo a round-trip
plane ticket and provided her with all of the necessary fraudu-
lent documents.8 3 The plan proceeded smoothly until officials
at the Nassau airport in the Bahamas became suspicious of the
group, which consisted of Mrs. Olowo, the young child, Mrs. Ali
and her friend. One witness, Officer Haas, later testified that
he saw Mrs. Olowo give the women instructions and hand docu-
ments over to them. 4 Mrs. Ali and her friend were exposed as
frauds after they separated from Mrs. Olowo and Grace.8 5 The
inspection officers allowed Mrs. Olowo and Grace to board the
77 Id. at 678-79.
78 Id. at 693.
79 Ericson, supra note 74, at 693-94.
80 Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 695 (7th Cir. 2004).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 696.
85 Id.
20061
13
PACE INT'L L. REV.
plane out of compassion and decided to continue their investiga-
tion in Chicago.8 6
A few months later, the INS questioned Mrs. Olowo about
the incident and she admitted in a sworn statement that she
presented officials with a false birth certificate that was pur-
chased by Mr. Ali.8 7 The statement led to a formal criminal
charge of knowingly aiding an alien in violation of INA
§ 212(a)(6)(E)(i). The statute states, "smugglers who knowingly
aid any other alien to enter United States is in violation of the
law and generally inadmissible."""
At the removal hearing the immigration judge found Mrs.
Olowo removable and required her return to Nigeria.8 9 Accord-
ing to the court, INS presented "sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence to show by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Olowo
had knowingly aided Grace to enter the U.S. "9° Moreover, the
court held that, "Mrs. Olowo's testimony was not credible be-
cause it was inconsistent, self-serving, vague, and implausible"
and that she tried to misinform the Court with her untruthful
testimony.91 The court determined she was an integral part of
the scheme rather than an ignorant helper.92
At the initial hearing, the immigration judge denied both of
Mrs. Olowo's applications for "asylum and withholding of re-
moval on the grounds that her daughters are members of a so-
cial group that is subjected to female genital mutilation in
Nigeria."93 Three factors influenced the lower court's denial of
asylum: 1) the daughters could remain in the United States
with their father because all three were legal permanent re-
sidents, 2) in Nigeria the father could reject the custom of FGM,
because evidence was shown that in traditional Nigerian society
the father has the right to refuse FGM of his daughters, and 3)
Mrs. Olowo had already been subjected to FGM so there was no
86 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 696.
87 Id.
88 Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1182 (2006)
(under this provision, legal permanent residents may be removed); see also Olowo,
368 F.3d at 696.
89 See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 697.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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fear of further persecution upon return.94 The BIA decision was
an oral affirmation of the immigration judge's holding. Thus,
the Court of Appeals directly applied the decision of the immi-
gration judge ignoring the true cultural and societal problems
that the Olowo family would face in Nigeria.
On May 11, 2004, Esther Olowo appealed to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed that she should be re-
moved due to her involvement with the smuggling of an illegal
alien into the United States. 95
Assuming Mrs. Olowo was guilty and her involvement jus-
tified a removal, the first issue to consider is whether the court
erred in denying a grant of asylum in the United States because
of her daughters' fear of FGM persecution in Nigeria. The Ap-
pellate Court rejected this argument saying, "derivative asy-
lum" is not permitted under these circumstances. 96 The
Appellate Court cited Oforji v. Ashcroft,97 for the principle that
"a court may not weigh potential hardship to a family member
with LPR [legal permanent status] or citizenship in the adjudi-
cation of an asylum claim."98 However, this principle is
debatable.
The Seventh Circuit supported a narrow view of Immigra-
tion Law, INA 208(b)(3), when it interpreted the statute's si-
lence on the child to parent form of derivative asylum to mean
the legislative intent was to prohibit automatic asylum under
such circumstances. 99 Under INA 208(b)(3) a court's granting
of asylum to a parent will result in automatic asylum for their
children and spouse. However, instances where a child is
granted asylum does not automatically result in a parent being
granted derivative asylum.100
Significantly, within a period of one week, the Sixth Circuit
faced the same set of issues and came to a different conclusion,
94 See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 698.
95 See id. However, the merit of this part of the decision is not the main issue
of this article.
96 Id. at 701.
97 Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003).
98 Rice, supra note 2, at 6.
99 Rice, supra note 2, at 14; see also INA 208(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A)
(2006).
100 See Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004); see also INA 208(b)(3), 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006).
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in Abay v. Ashcroft. 10 In Abay, the court held that a mother
could seek asylum due to her individual fear that FGM would
be forced upon her children. 10 2 The Sixth Circuit's decision al-
lowed parents to seek asylum based on the torment that they
would suffer for fear of their children's well-being. This holding
was coined "the common sense compassionate decision."10 3 The
momentum arising from the Abay decision should motivate
Congress to pass complementary legislation that protects fam-
ily unity and human rights. Otherwise mothers will continue to
suffer the emotional dilemma and persecution of either having
to watch their daughters endure FGM or leave them behind to
grow-up on the other side of the world.
A comparison of Olowo v. Ashcroft and Abay v. Ashcroft il-
lustrates the dangers of using different statutory interpreta-
tions and judicial constructions to determine whether a mother
meets the criteria for asylum. In Olowo, the court relied on the
concept of "derivative asylum" or "bootstrapping," however in
Abay, the mother's persecution was viewed as her own emo-
tional persecution, separate from her daughter's physical perse-
cution from FGM. 0 4
B. Abay v. Ashcroft
The petitioner in Abay v. Ashcroft, argued that as a mother
she "was eligible for asylum in her own right based on her fear
that her daughters will be subjected to the torture of female
genital mutilation, rather than arguing 'derivative asylum."'10 5
The court agreed with Ms. Abay, holding that it was not uncom-
mon for immediate family members to be themselves "perse-
cuted" as loved ones experience suffering. 0 6
The facts of Abay are as follows. Abay and her daughter,
Amare, came to the United States as visitors on May 18,
1993.107 After a failed attempt to gain asylum, both were or-
101 See Abay, 368 F.3d 634.
102 Id.
103 Female Genital Cutting Education and Networking Project, http://www.
fgmnetwork.orgfhtmllmodules.php?name=news&file=article&sid=38 (last visited
Jan. 17, 2005).
104 Rice, supra note 2, at 5.
105 Abay, 368 F.3d at 641.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 636.
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dered to be deported until they filed a new request for asylum
with a supplemental brief arguing that Amare would be sub-
jected to female genital mutilation if sent back to Ethiopia.'08
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit denounced the lower court's inabil-
ity to consider the cultural pressures that exist in Ethiopia and
the ninety percent practice rate of FGM.109 For example,
threats from a future husband and his family to perform FGM
on Abay's daughter were to be considered because at some point
Abay would not have the ability to protect her daughter in the
community. 1" 0 In addition, the court also spoke of "social ostra-
cism" as support for Amare's fears to meet the criteria of "refu-
gee" under the Immigration and Naturalization Act."'
Abay's own persecution admittedly did not arise from a "de-
rivative asylum" claim, but rather her own fear that came from
personal experience of FGM and her understanding of how the
community and its traditions function in Ethiopia.1 2 According
to the court, Abay's satisfactory description of her fear for her
daughter's safety was well founded and "there [was] over-
whelming objective evidence that a female child in Ethiopia
[would] likely undergo female genital mutilation at some point,"
thus, the mother should also be granted asylum. 1 3
V. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF CHILD-PARENT ASyLuM
A. "Persecution"
The adoption of a broad definition of "persecution" is criti-
cal to the acceptance of asylum claims made by parents who re-
quest child-parent asylum in FGM cases. Traditionally,
"persecution" may include psychological harm in addition to
physical harm."14 Moreover, "an individual's personal experi-
ence of the infliction of severe harm on an immediate family
member can provide him or her with grounds for refugee protec-
tion."1 15 Congress removed the word "physical," thereby al-
108 Id.
109 Abay, 368 F.3d at 639.
110 See id.
111 Id. at 640. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2005).
112 Abay, 368 F.3d, at 641.
113 Id.
114 Rice, supra note 2, at 8.
115 Id.
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lowing persecution to encompass economic and emotional
damage. 116 "The psychological harm inflicted on a parent who
is forced to stand by as his or her child's genitals are cut can
hardly be regarded as less offensive than the economic harm...
recognized as persecution more than thirty years ago."117 The
broader definition is appropriate given the impossible choice be-
tween raising a child and consenting to torture.
The Abay decision uses the broader definition of persecu-
tion and is supported by the case, In Matter of Dibba."18 In
Abay, the court used the Board's decision in Dibba, along with a
few others, to "suggest a governing principle in favor of refugee
status in cases where a parent as protector is faced with expos-
ing her child to the clear risk of being subjected against her will
to practice that is a form of physical torture causing grave and
permanent harm."1 19 According to the court, there is a strong
basis to argue in favor of family unity because it is wrong to
expect a parent to leave behind her child in the United
States. 120
B. Comparison of Olowo and Abay
The Olowo court based its ruling on the assumption that if
the whole family returned to Nigeria, Mr. Olowo would be capa-
ble of protecting his daughters from FGM by rejecting the tradi-
tion and shielding Mrs. Olowo from having to watch her
daughters undergo the procedure. 121 The Sixth Circuit in Abay,
dismissed such reasoning. The court's decision was based on
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Where an alien mother applied for asylum based on her fear that her
daughters would be forced to undergo FGM, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) stated, "[niormally a mother would not be expected to leave her child in the
United States to avoid persecution." Abay, 368 F.3d at 641 (quoting Matter of
Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (B.I.A. Nov. 23, 2001)).
119 Abay, 368 F.3d at 642. For example, the Abay court cited Matter of
Adeniji, No. A41 542 131 (oral decision) (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Immigration Court,
York, Penn., Mar. 10, 1998) where a father was granted asylum because if forced to
go back to Nigeria his daughters would be forced to be subjected to FGM. The
court also cited Matter of Oluloro, No. A72 147 491 (oral decision) (U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Immigration Court, Seattle, Wash., Mar. 23, 1994), where an alien mother
was granted asylum in the U.S. because her daughters who were U.S. citizens
would be sent back to Nigeria and "posed an extreme hardship" of FGM.
120 See Abay, 368 F.3d at 642.
121 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 698 (7th Cir. 2004).
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research which indicated that, in addition to young girls under
the control of their parents, adult women are also subjected to
FGM for several reasons. An adult woman may be subjected to
this painful procedure in order to become suitable for marriage,
or her husband may have her vagina sewn shut to keep her
from having an affair. Last, a woman's vagina may be sewn up
after giving birth to a child. 122 Thus, it is an over simplification
of the court to declare Mr. Olowo the ultimate decision-maker
and protector of his daughters from FGM. The court neglected
to consider important cultural factors in its analysis and by ap-
plying the cultural norms of the United States, rather than
those of Nigeria, it failed to fully comprehend the fear of Mrs.
Olowo and her daughters.
Today in Nigeria the notion of being clean and sexually
pure remains prominent.123 Consideration of a native country's
traditions and culture should be an important factor in helping
the court to weigh an applicant's credibility. 124 The Olowo court
recognized the concept of "extreme hardship" on the children,
however it refused to expand that notion of compassion to the
present facts, when one parent was able to remain in the United
States with the children. 125 What is considered an unthinkable
act by parents in the United States is respected in other cul-
tures. Thus, "parents who resist FGC [FGM] also frequently
face ostracism and can be subjected to bodily harm for their
opposition."126
The court's decision was also based on the rationale that
Mrs. Olowo would not be subject to future persecution because
she already underwent FGM and, therefore, could not fit within
the statutory definition of "refugee."127 Again, this factor is in-
consistent with the determination of the Abay court, which
stated that the mother was persecuted "in her own right" when
subjected to the reasonable fear that her daughter would be
subject to female genital mutilation. 128 The Abay court found
emotional stress to be the source of persecution, not the actual
122 Abay, 368 F.3d at 638-39; see also TouSiA, supra note 60, at 11-13.
123 See TOUBIA, supra note 60, at 37.
124 See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 698-99.
125 Id. at 699-702.
126 Rice, supra note 2, at 2.
127 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 700.
128 Abay, 368 F.3d at 641.
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cutting of the mother's genitalia. Although this rationale has
not been supported in the Seventh Circuit, the Abay decision
may break new ground for activists of female genital mutilation
refugees.
C. United States Policy of Family Unity
The judges in Olowo largely relied on the fact that Mr.
Olowo, the appellant's husband, was capable of staying in the
United States with his two daughters because they were all le-
gal permanent U.S. residents.129 The court noted that if the De-
partment of Homeland Security wanted to charge the husband,
and tried to remove him in connection with the smuggling of
aliens, then the court would have to consider the potential hard-
ships affecting the daughters. 130 Following this rationale, it is
clear that the court did not consider the division of a family and
the separation of two young girls from their mother as sufficient
to foster "potential hardships."131
During the hearing, Mrs. Olowo told the court that if she
was sent back to Nigeria she would have to take her daughters
with her, exposing them to the threats of her extended family
who would force the girls to undergo FGM.132 The court misin-
terpreted this statement as a threat by Olowo that she would
subject her daughters to FGM unless the court granted her asy-
lum, but the statement was made to inform the court of what
she viewed as her only reasonable alternative. Mrs. Olowo's sit-
uation was not viewed from a perspective that respected and
understood her background, tradition, or the Nigerian family
structure. The court ignored the fact that female genital muti-
lation is a topic of great debate and is based in the "traditional
values" of certain cultures and traditional "gender roles."133
The complexity of the situation is driven by the demands of the
native culture regardless of whether the family is located in
United States or Nigeria. 134 Thus, from Mrs. Olowo's subjective
point of view, it is reasonable to believe that her husband would
129 See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 698.
130 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701 (citing Cerrillo-Perez v. INS, 809 F.2d 1425-26 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
131 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 701.
132 See id. at 701-02.
133 See TOUBiA, supra note 60, at 35-37.
134 See generally Olowo, 368 F.3d at 692.
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not be able to care for her two children alone. Assuming Mrs.
Olowo returned to Nigeria alone, she would certainly be "perse-
cuted" from the social ostracism and the separation from her
children, despite this language not being included in the statu-
tory construction of Immigration & Nationality Act
§ 212(a)(6)(E)(i). 135 Putting a family in such an impossible situ-
ation is undoubtedly a form of persecution.
D. Best Interests of the Child
The Olowo court also discussed, in the second half of its
opinion, the role of the government to secure the safety of the
children and the need to have the rights of children protected
when their best interests do not parallel their parents' inter-
ests.136 Under U.S. federal law, 18 U.S.C. § 116, "(a) whoever
knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates the whole or any
part of the labia majora or labia minora or clitoris of another
person who has not attained the age of 18 years shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than 5 years or
both."137 Mrs. Olowo raised red flags, declaring to the court
that she would bring her children back to Nigeria if removed
from the United States. The court believed this comment im-
plied that she would consent to the genital cutting of her daugh-
ters in order to keep them with her.13 The consequences of the
court's decision therefore conflicted with the best interests of
the children to grow up with their mother present and to avoid
FGM.
The criminalization of FGM is supported by national, state,
and international law. 139 On the national level, Congress-
woman Schroeder, a supporter of the 1995 legislation, "argues
that the state's interest in child welfare trumps any concern of
parental rights, religious liberty, or multiculturalism ....
Congresswoman Schroeder is very determined to ban female
genital cutting because it violates the American sentiment "to-
135 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (a)(6)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(2005).
136 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 703-04.
137 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2004).
138 See Olowo, 368 F.3d at 703.
139 See Rahman, supra note 17, at 236-37.
140 Breitung, supra note 70, at 672-73.
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ward women's equality and women's place in society. ' 141 The
State of Illinois also prohibits female genital mutilation under
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/12-34. It is one of fifteen states with such
a law.142 On an international scale, both individual countries
and international governing bodies have produced laws barring
FGM. For example, Great Britain has specifically responded to
the threat of FGM abroad proclaiming that "[plarents who take
their daughters abroad to undergo genital circumcision will be
sentenced to up to 14 years in prison under a new law."1 43
Overall, the United States must implement laws to stop
non refugee parents from taking their children back to a native
country where they face persecution. The best way to accom-
plish this goal is to support the classic U.S. policy of "family
unity."1 44 Neither a single parent home nor the Illinois foster
care system is an ideal environment for the Olowo twins. They
both want and need the compassion of their mother, which is
critical to child development. It is a violation of American policy
to separate a family who has no choice in light of the impossible
alternative of subjecting the children to FGM. Mrs. Olowo
would be a criminal if she took her children back with her and,
yet, would be a bad mother and social outcast in Nigeria if she
left her children behind in the United States. No mother should
have to make this choice; it is against human nature to make a
parent do such a thing.1 45 Family unity is a primary goal of
immigration law, "so no less protection should be given to refu-
gees than other immigrants.' 46 The Seventh Circuit court, in
Polovchak v. Messe, authorized the termination of the parent's
custody rights in order to prevent the parents from removing
their child to the Soviet Union when it was in the child's best
interests to remain in the United States. 147 This case high-
lights the court's capacity to split apart a family when it is not
141 Id. at 672-73.
142 Olowo, 368 F.3d at 702; Rahman, supra note 17, at 237; 720 Ill. Comp. Stat.
5/12-34.
143 UK: New Female Circumcision Bill Closes Loophole, ANSA-ENG. MEDIA
SERV., Mar. 3, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 64006952. See also Breitung,
supra note 70.
144 Rice, supra note 2, at 15.
145 See id.
146 Id.
147 See Polovchak v. Messe, 774 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1985).
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in the child's best interests given the facts and circumstances of
the individual case.
Congress must consider the impossible dilemma facing
these families when proposing future legislation. Legislators
should be particularly concerned with expanding "derivative
persecution" to parents or guardians of children who face the
threat of female genital mutilation in their native country. 148
E. International Support
Since the child-parent issue has split in the circuit courts,
legislators must gather information on an international level to
see how effective the Abay decision could be as an overall asy-
lum policy.
Overall, sixteen countries have criminalized female genital
mutilation, including nine African countries. 149 However,
France is the only country known to regularly prosecute and
imprison for the crime of FGM.150 Both French and American
law provides different periods of imprisonment for parents than
performing parties, mainly because the separation from a
lengthy prison term typically causes "undo hardship on the
child."15 ' This rationale is a bit ironic considering the court's
intention to permanently separate the Olowo twins from their
mother. Interestingly, the United States varies from the other
countries where FGM is a crime, because the statute only refers
to minors.15 2 The notion of FGM being a threat to women of
varying ages has been addressed in this article and, thus, an
additional statutory correction should be made on this issue.
In Canada, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board
first addressed the FGM asylum problem in a case involving
Kandra Hassan Farah of Somalia.'5 3 Farah, under new guide-
lines which liberalized the determination of refugee status, was
granted asylum after she provided evidence and testified to the
conditions in Somalia and the threats from her ex-in-laws of
148 Rice, supra note 2, at 15.
149 Rahman, supra note 17, at 57.
150 Id. at 57, 65.
151 Id. at 64-5.
152 Id. at 66.
153 Breitung, supra note 70, at 671-72.
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FGM if she returned to her native country.154 The case high-
lights the social emphasis on female purity, its inevitable link to
FGM, and the importance of broadening the scope of permissi-
ble refugees in order to cover this persecuted group. In another
Canadian case, a mother was granted a stay of execution be-
cause "... irreparable harm [would] occur in the interim should
the child be removed to Nigeria with her mother."1 55 The court
continued by stating that although it is "normally concerned
with irreparable harm to the applicant, in the circumstances of
this case, the interests of the infant child are inseparably linked
with those of the applicant." 15 6 Thus, the court found the appli-
cant and her daughter "de facto inseparable." 57 This example
addresses the second part of the Olowo case where the Seventh
Circuit discusses its concerns about ensuring the best interests
of the child. 158 A policy similar to the Canadian example would
be an appropriate model for American courts to follow when de-
termining whether or not to separate a young child from her
mother. Mrs. Olowo posed no threat to the children in the role
of their mother; she was a credible witness with parenting skills
which the court did not question.
In addition to supporting Canadian case law, legislators
must look closely at the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights Resolution 1989/57, which created the Convention for
Rights of Children. 59 The March 8, 1989 resolution resulted in
a binding document on all member countries, which expanded
the notions of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child by ad-
dressing the treatment of children and the prohibition of their
exploitation and inhumane treatment. 60 The threat posed to
children touches upon the larger problem with FGM, which is
that the practice itself violates fundamental international
human rights law.' 6 ' Advocates argue that the victimization
that results from FGM stems from more than physical and emo-
154 See id.
155 Rice, supra note 2, at 11; Obasohan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration), 2001 CarswellNat 325, 2001 FCT 92, 13 IMM. L.R. (3d) 82.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 704 (7th Cir. 2004).
159 See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/
25 (Dec. 12, 1989), available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/child.html.
160 See id.
161 See Rahman, supra note 17, at 3.
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tional suffering because "[FGM] is at its essence a basic viola-
tion of girls' and women's rights to physical integrity." 162 The
United States needs to respect international laws that are de-
signed to protect children worldwide.
VI. THE NEED FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION
Critics of expanding immigration laws to include derivative
persecution, argue that it will be impossible to draw a line be-
tween which family members should be able to claim the de-
fense. The answer to that critique is simply that American
policy, tradition, and the Constitution expect the government to
make an effort to support family unity and, thus, in this situa-
tion it must do everything it can to properly grant this defense
to aliens who fit the criteria. The new legislation must expand
the scope of statutory interpretation to include granting a fam-
ily member asylum in the United States if the evidence estab-
lishes that 1) the witness is credible, 2) the threat of FGM is
credible to the other family member, and 3) the relationship is
between parent and child (or guardian and child). This article
does not, for example, suggest a distant cousin or aunt should
be able to base her removal defense on the fear that her niece
will be subjected to FGM, unless, of course, she is the child's
legal guardian.
Also, courts under the new statute should retain their
power of discretion in a fact based analysis. If Congress clari-
fies the child-parent derivative asylum as recommended, then
when instances arise, courts across the country will base their
decisions on a similar statutory interpretation and analysis. In
the spring of 2004, the circuit courts made it clear that this area
of immigration law needed clarification. In the future, the law
must be improved so that in the course of one week, one family
will not be torn apart while another remains united, simply be-
cause they lived in a different judicial circuit.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under current asylum law, there are no clear guidelines of
how courts should deal with parents who seek asylum due to
the fear of their children being subjected to female genital muti-
162 Id.
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lation. Criticism of this statutory problem is essential to moti-
vating legislators to act and promote consistency in dealing
with refugees. The unfortunate reality is that FGM is deeply
rooted within many cultures and will take much time and en-
ergy to reverse the old customs. Thus, the United States, as a
"receiving country" of immigrants, 163 has a responsibility to
protect both the children and women who face the physical and
emotional persecution of FGM at home and abroad. Undoubt-
edly, federal legislation is the best way to uphold the United
States' obligation to international human rights law and funda-
mental American policies of family unity and equal protection.
163 Rahman, supra note 17, at 57.
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